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AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER LIABILITY-FIRST CIRCUIT
UNDERMINES FAA'S EFFORTS TO INCORPORATE
REDUNDANCY INTO AVIATION SAFETY
PROCEDURES: WOJCIECHOWICZ V. UNITED STATES
JOE VAN ASTEN*
IN WOJCIECHOWICZ v. United States, the First Circuit held thatan air traffic controller owed no duty to a pilot involved in a
tragic plane crash that killed the pilot and four of his passen-
gers; and, ultimately, concluded that the pilot was solely at
fault.' In so holding, the First Circuit seemingly ignored Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations and under-
mined the FAA's goals of enhancing aviation safety through
redundant or concurrent responsibilities between a pilot and an
air traffic controller. The FAA deliberately created redundant
operations procedures between pilots and air traffic controllers
that "intentionally overlap ... to compensate .. . for failures that
may affect safety."z The First Circuit's holding in this case po-
tentially weakens aviation safety and accident prevention proce-
dures by not recognizing the air traffic controller's concurrent
duty to make a reasonable effort to prevent such accidents. In-
stead, the more prudent holding would have been to remand
the case to the district court to apportion liability between the
pilot and the air traffic controller, thereby upholding the FAA's
efforts to incorporate redundant safety procedures.
At roughly 2:00 p.m. on January 5, 2005, a Cessna Conquest
airplane took off from Culebra Island in Puerto Rico heading
for San Juan International Airport, near the El Yunque moun-
tain peak.' The pilot of the plane, Alexander Wojciechowicz,
chose to fly that day under Visual Flight Rules (VFR), as op-
* J.D. Candidate 2011, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.S. Communications 2004, magna cum laude, Florida State University. To
Kristen: thank you for your unwavering love and support.
1 582 F.3d 57, 61 (1st Cir. 2009).
2 FAA, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Aeronautical Info. Manual § 5-5-1(e) (2008).
3 Wojciechowicz, 582 F.3d at 61-62.
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posed to Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), which meant he would
navigate simply by observing his surroundings rather than rely-
ing on his instruments.' Among other proscriptions, VFR pro-
hibits a pilot from flying into clouds or areas of reduced
visibility, yet Wojciechowicz did exactly that shortly before the
crash.5
About eighteen minutes after Wojciechowicz and his passen-
gers left Culebra Island, he contacted the San Juan airport to
request to land.6 At 2:18:30 p.m. Marcos Santiago, the air traffic
controller at the San Juan Airport, asked Wojciechowicz to
"squawk" into the airplane's transponder so that Santiago could
identify him on his radar screen.' Wojciechowicz complied and
at 2:19:54 p.m. Santiago, now able to see the plane on his radar
screen, provided Wojciechowicz with approach instructions so
that he could land at the airport.' Santiago's radar scope dis-
played the plane's altitude above sea level and the prominent
obstructions, including El Yunque, but it did not display the ele-
vation of the terrain or the plane's altitude above the ground.'
At 2:21:18 p.m., shortly before the accident, the plane disap-
peared from the radar screen.10 At that point, the plane was 4.7
miles away from the peak of El Yunque, 1600 feet above sea
level, and traveling at roughly 3 miles per minute." After the
plane lost radar contact, the radar scope entered into "coast"
mode, where the scope estimates the planes current position.12
At 2:21:42 p.m., the radar stopped displaying the "coast" data,
and the plane never returned to the radar screen.1 3 Santiago
did not attempt to initiate radio contact again until practically
the time of impact.1 4 The plane crashed into the side of the
mountain at approximately 2:23 p.m., 1.43 miles from the peak
of El Yunque at 1,561 feet above sea level (El Yunque is 3,637
feet tall at its peak). 5
4 Id.




9 Id. at 63.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 62.
12 Id. at 63.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 77 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 63.
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Wojciechowicz's surviving relatives, the registered owner of
the airplane, and the airplane's insurer sued the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging that Santiago acted
negligently and was partially at fault for the accident.' 6 Plaintiffs
conceded that Wojciechowicz acted negligently since he flew
into the cloud before the crash, but they claimed that Santiago
failed to separate the plane from the El Yunque peak as re-
quired by P 5-5-9 of the Air Traffic Controllers Manual
(ATCM)." After a bench trial, the district court entered judg-
ment in favor of the United States, holding that the provisions
of the ATCM did not apply in this situation; therefore, Santiago
had not violated any duty." The district court also held that
Wojciechowicz's negligence was the sole cause of the accident.19
The First Circuit, in a split decision, affirmed the judgment.20
The First Circuit had to decide: 1) whether P 5-5-9 of the
ATCM applied to this situation, so as to impose a duty on an air
traffic controller (either in the context of negligence per se or
ordinary negligence); if so, 2) the scope of that duty; and 3)
whether a breach of that duty occurred. 2 1 First, the majority
held that the provisions of the ATCM did not have the full force
and effect of law as does a regulation; and therefore, that any
violation of the ATCM would not constitute negligence per se."
Second, even assuming that the ATCM did have the effect of a
regulation, the majority maintained that no violation of P 5-5-9
occurred because the scope of P 5-5-9 did not extend to planes
that had dropped off the radar as Wojciechowicz's plane had.
Finally, the majority held that since any duty Santiago had en-
ded when the plane dropped off radar, he acted reasonably and
could not have foreseen that Wojciechowicz would act
negligently.24
The majority rejected the idea that operations manuals pub-
lished by the FAA, such as the ATCM or the Aeronautical Infor-
mation Manual (AIM), had the same effect as an FAA
regulation. Instead, the court considered the manuals to be
16 Id. at 61.
17 Id. at 63-64.
18 Id. at 65.
19 Id. at 66.
20 Id. at 60-61.
21 Id. at 68.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 69.
24 Id. at 70.
25 Id. at 68.
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"merely an indication of the standard of care." 26 Furthermore,
as an apparently better indication of the standard of care than P
5-5-9 of the ATCM, the court looked to the AIM, which provides
in P 5-5-8 that the pilot "'is responsible to see and avoid other
traffic, terrain, or obstacles.' "27 Therefore, the court concluded
that a violation of P 5-5-9 of the ATCM cannot constitute negli-
gence per se but can only be persuasive as to the standard of
care.2 8 However, according to the court, the more persuasive
indication of the standard of care in this situation was P 5-5-8 of
the AIM, which places the responsibility of avoiding terrain and
obstructions on the pilot.29
The majority next maintained that even if P 5-5-9 of the
ATCM defined the relevant duty in this situation, the scope of
that duty did not extend to an airplane that had lost radar con-
tact; therefore, Santiago could not have violated a duty.s0 Ac-
cording to P 5-5-9, which is titled "Separation from
Obstructions," an air traffic controller must "'separate aircraft
from prominent obstructions depicted on the radar scope . .. by
. . . 3 miles.' "3 ' When Wojciechowicz's plane dropped off radar,
it was located 4.7 miles from the peak of El Yunque and was not
within the 3-mile buffer.3 2 Because an air traffic controller
could not know the course or altitude of a plane flying under
VFR once radar contact ceases, and because pilots could change
course or altitude at anytime (as opposed to IFR, where a spe-
cific flight plan is followed), Santiago could not have known for
certain if the plane came within 3 miles of El Yunque.3 3 There-
fore, the court concluded that Santiago reasonably assumed that
Wojciechowicz was complying with his duties to avoid terrain
and stay out of cloud cover, and accordingly did not violate P 5-
59345-9.4
Finally, even if Santiago breached a duty under P 5-5-9, the
majority held that there was no proximate cause between the
26 Id. at 64 (citing Fed. Express Corp. v. Rhode Island, 664 F.2d 830, 835 (1st
Cir. 1981)).
27 Id. (quoting FAA, supra note 2, § 5-5-8(a)).
28 Id. at 67 (citing In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15, 28 (1st Cir. 1982); Fed.
Express Corp., 664 F.2d at 835).
29 Id. (citing In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d at 31; Fed. Express Corp., 664 F.2d at
836-37).
30 Id. at 69.
3i Id. at 64 (citing FAA, supra note 2, § 5-5-9).
32 Id. at 63.
3 Id. at 69.
- Id.
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breach and the accident; more specifically, that the accident was
not foreseeable to Santiago." The majority held that
Wojciechowicz's decision to fly into a cloud at low altitude and
high speed over mountainous terrain was the sole cause of the
accident." Furthermore, Santiago could not have reasonably
foreseen that Wojciechowicz would act in such a negligent way.37
Ultimately, however, the majority affirmed the district court's
decision finding that Santiago never owed a duty to
Wojciechowicz or his passengers in the first place, assigning the
liability solely to Wojciechowicz without apportioning any liabil-
ity to Santiago or the government.38
The First Circuit majority misperceives both First Circuit pre-
cedent and FAA regulation to craft an opinion that sets a prece-
dent concerning an air traffic controller's duty of care that
undermines the important concept of redundancy in aviation
safety. The majority's first conclusion that P 5-5-9 of the ATCM
does not have the full force and effect of law-and ultimately,
that Santiago owed no duty in this situation-seemingly ignores
clearly stated FAA regulation to the contrary.39 Federal Aviation
Regulation 14 C.F.R. § 65.45(a) plainly states that "'[a]n air traf-
fic control tower operator shall perform his duties in accor-
dance with . . . the procedures and practices prescribed in air
traffic control manuals of the FAA." 40 Thus, the regulations
themselves essentially incorporate the manuals, giving them the
force and effect of law. The majority goes on to apply Federal
Express much too broadly in stating that the case stands for the
proposition that these manuals do not have the force and effect
of law. Instead, Federal Express merely stated that courts should
not construe every minor deviation from the manual as consti-
tuting negligence and should instead focus on "substantial and
unjustified failure [s] to follow procedures made mandatory by
the Manual.' " 2 Even if the manuals were considered only as a
persuasive indication of the standard of care-as the majority
contends-the majority incorrectly implies that P 5-5-8 of the
3 Id.
36 Id. at 70.
3 Id.
38 Id. at 61.
3 Id. at 72-73 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 73 (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 65.45(a) (2009)).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 73 n.20 (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v. Rhode Island, 664 F.2d 830,
835 (1st Cir. 1981)).
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AIM, which states that pilots are responsible to avoid terrain or
obstacles, somehow supplants or relieves the air traffic control-
lers of their duty to maintain separation between the airplane
and obstacles when a pilot is flying under VFR.4 s The dissent
correctly points out that "controllers and pilots have a concur-
rent duty to maintain safety."4 4 In fact, P 5-5-1 (e) of the AIM
clearly stresses the importance of this concurrent duty: "The re-
sponsibilities of the pilot and controller intentionally overlap in
many areas providing a degree of redundancy. Should one or
the other fail in any manner, this overlapping responsibility is
expected to compensate, in many cases, for failures that may af-
fect safety."4 5
Furthermore, nothing in the language of P 5-5-9 of the ATCM
excludes VFR flights from a controller's duty to maintain separa-
tion.4 6 It seems apparent that Santiago had a duty to give a rea-
sonable effort to maintain separation between Wojciechowicz
and El Yunque.
The majority still argues, however, that if such a concurrent
duty existed, the scope of Santiago's duty did not extend to a
plane that lost radar contact; therefore, Santiago acted reasona-
bly in making no effort to maintain separation.4 7 However,
nothing in the language of P 5-5-9 limits the duty to airplanes
that maintain constant radar contact.4 8 Of course, the circum-
stances of Wojciechowicz flying that day under VFR and his
plane losing radar contact changes what kind of effort would be
considered reasonable given those limitations, but those limita-
tions certainly do not allow for zero effort on the part of Santi-
ago to maintain separation. Instead, Santiago reasonably could
have advised Wojciechowicz that, according to the last data avail-
able to Santiago, Wojciechowicz could be within the 3-mile
buffer and may need to take action accordingly. Roughly one
minute and forty seconds passed between the time that radar
contact was lost and impact.4 9 In that time, Wojciechowicz
could have exited the cloud he was flying through and made a
43 See id. at 64-65.
4 Id. at 74 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (citing Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. United States,
561 F.2d 381, 392 (1st Cir. 1977)).
4 Id. (quoting FAA, supra note 2, § 5-5-1(e)).
46 Id.; FAA, supra note 2, § 5-5-9 (stating that an air traffic controller must "sep-
arate aircraft from prominent obstructions depicted on the radar scope ... by ...
3 miles").
47 Id. at 75.
48 Id.
4 Id. at 63.
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corrective maneuver in time to prevent the crash, even if Santi-
ago had waited the 30-40 seconds it would have taken for the
plane to enter the 3-mile buffer based on its last known direc-
tion and speed."o Additionally, the notion that Santiago's
breach could not have been the proximate cause of the accident
because Wojciechowicz's negligent conduct was unforeseeable
seemingly contradicts the FAA's intentional establishment of
concurrent, redundant responsibility.5' The redundancy of re-
sponsibilities built in by the FAA "effectively incorporates an as-
sumption that pilot negligence is foreseeable."5 Santiago not
only had a duty, but also breached that duty by failing to make a
reasonable effort to maintain separation, which would have pro-
vided a foreseeably negligent Wojciechowicz with ample time to
make a corrective maneuver. Therefore, the First Circuit major-
ity should have reversed and remanded the case to the district
court to apportion liability between Wojciechowicz and the
government.
Without question, the lion's share of responsibility for this ac-
cident falls squarely on Mr. Wojciechowicz. But by failing to ac-
knowledge that Santiago failed in his duties as an air traffic
controller, the First Circuit undermines the FAA's clearly stated
intention to build in redundancy as a part of the aviation safety
regulations. The courts can play an important role in cement-
ing the FAA's goal of redundancy by applying the theory of con-
current responsibility. As one commentator noted: "To prevent
[aviation] accidents, it is imperative that all of those who can
influence safety fulfill their duties. . . . Any party with access to
information that could prevent an accident must be held re-
sponsible to air travelers."5 3 Holding that an air traffic control-
ler has no duty to act in this situation or that a controller may
assume a pilot is not acting negligently seems to contradict the
paramount goal of safety and accident prevention-especially
considering that the effort required to act is relatively minimal
50 According to expert testimony, Wojciechowicz would have only needed
17-18 seconds to perform a corrective maneuver. Id. at 76 (Lipez,J., dissenting).
Given the planes position, direction, and speed-4.7 miles from the peak of El
Yunque, heading towards the mountain at a speed of about 3 miles per minute-
it would have taken about 30-40 seconds for the plane to make up the 1.7 mile
distance between its last known position and the 3-mile buffer. See supra text
accompanying note 11.
51 Wojciechowicz, 582 F.3d at 75 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
52 Id.
53 Kathleen McChesney Goodman & Scott Davis, Free Flight and the Pilot-in-Com-
mand Concept-A Recipe for Disaster?, 62 J. AIR L. & CoM. 653, 672-73 (1997).
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and the risk of inaction can be quite clearly disastrous. It seems
likely that the vast majority of times that a controller makes an
effort to maintain separation in these circumstances it would be
completely unnecessary. However, the one time that it is neces-
sary, which in turn prevents an accident, more than justifies the
controller's previously unneeded efforts and is exactly the point
of redundancy. While it may be overdramatic to claim that the
First Circuit's holding makes flying less safe; at the very least, the
holding does nothing to solidify the FAA's laudable and neces-
sary redundant safety procedures. Courts should, in an effort to
uphold the FAA's goals in aviation safety, acknowledge the con-
current duty of the air traffic controller in this situation and ap-
portion liability between the pilot and the controller.
